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MATHEMAT ICS AND WORDPLAY 

MARTIN GARDNER 
Henderson ville, North Carolina 
Many mathematicians enjoy wordplay, and for obvious reasons. 
It is almost a branch of combinatorial mathematic s. The pleasure 
derived from solving a combinatorial problem is very much like 
the pleasure of solving a cryptogram or a crossword puzzle, or 
constructing a good pc lindrome. Given the formal system of arith­
metic, ancient mathematicians asked themselves whether the digits 
1 through 9 could be placed in a three-by-three matrix so that 
rows, columns, and the two diagonals had the same sum. This 
is not much different from asking if, given the formal rules of 
English, one can construct a three-by-three word square in which 
each row, column, and main diagonal is a different word. 
There is, of course, a difference between com bina torial ma thema t­
ics and wordplay. Mathematics is embodied in the structure of 
the universe. Although mathematical systems are free inventions 
of human minds, the y have astonishing applications to nature. 
No one expected non-Euclidian geometry to be useful, but it proved 
t o be essential to relativity theory. Boolean algebra seemed use­
less until surprise' - it turned out to model the electrical net­
works of computers. There are hundreds of other outstanding in­
stances of what physicist Eugene Wigner has called the "unreason­
able effectiveness of mathematics". 
Think of the letters and words of a language, together with 
its rules, as a formal s y stem. Although the words have arbitrary 
meanings assigned to them b y minds, and there may be a "deep 
structure" of s y ntax that conforms to logic, the words themselves 
have no reality apart from a culture. Butterflies are all over 
the world, but yo u will not find the word "butterfly" by looking 
throu gh a telescope or microscope. However, once the word becomes 
attached to butterflies, it is amusing to observe that butterflies 
flutter by. Because language, unlike mathematics, is "artificial", 
wordpla y has more in common with, say, inventing card tricks 
or playin g chess. 
The combinatorial nature of wordplay is underscored b y the 
recent use of computers for solving word problems. Disks contain­
ing all the words of a langua g e are now available. With suitable 
program s the y can be used to construct word squares, find ana­
grams, shortest word ladders, and so on . I wouldn't be surprised 
if some da y computers will solve complicated crosswords as easily 
as the y now solve chess problems. 
It is worth noting that both in mathematics and wordplay, solv­
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ing a problem is curiously like confirming a theory. In solving 
a cryptogram, for example, one first makes conjectures. Is a sin­
gle-letter word A or I, or maybe O? Is ABCA the word "that"? 
Such conjectures are then tested to see if they lead to contradic­
tions. If they lead to other words, they gain in their probability 
of being correct. Eventually a point is reached at which one is 
certain that a cryptogram has been cracked even though not all 
its letters are known. 
One is tempted to say that when all words are known one can 
be absolutely certain a cryptogram has been solved. This is not 
the case because, especially if the cryptogram is short, there 
just could be another solution that the composer of the puzzle 
intended. If, however, the cryptogram is long, such uncertainty 
becomes vanishingly small. This is true also in science. When 
there is a large abundance of facts explained by a theory, such 
as by the Copernican theory or the theory of evolution, certainty 
reaches a probability of 0.99999999 ... 
Now for a deep metaphysical question. If chess had not been 
invented, is there a sense in which theorems about chess can be 
said to exist? Assuming the formal system of chess, and given 
a certain position on the board, is it permissible to say that 
there is a mate in three moves even if no one has posed the prob­
lem? -Assuming the structure of a deck of cards, is there a sense 
in which a good ca rd trick is somehow "out there ," in a PIa tonic 
realm of universals, even if no cc: rds existed? 
Suppose there were no English language. Would it be meaningful 
to say that given such a language, there is a sense in which 
a certain anagram "exists" even if no one spoke English? It is 
something like asking if a certain number with a million digits 
is prime or composite before anyone has tested the number to find 
out. Well, not quite, because alithmetic certainly "exists" as a 
forma 1 system. Anywa y , most mathema ticans are PIa ton ists who 
believe that, no matter how bizarre, or how fa r removed from 
realit y a system can be, the y "discover" its theorems rather than 
invent them. Even though English is a human construction, nowhere 
to be found in nature, is there a sense in which its wordplays 
are "real" before anyone finds them? I leave answering this to 
my readers. 
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